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THE SECULAR SPIRITUALITY
OF FORMER EASTERN BLOC DISSIDENTS
by Leslie A. Muray
Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili Stalin, "the great friend of progressive humanity,"
"the great liberator of the Hungarian people," died on March 5, 1953. The news of his death was
released by the Kremlin the next day.
The Budapest in which I was living at the time with my parents as a four year old was
draped in black flags; the slow, melancholy sound of funeral marches was all that could be heard
on the radio (there was no T.V. at that time). One of our neighbors, either unbelievably but
authentically ignorant or an "agent provocateur," asked why all the signs of national mourning?
Another neighbor responded (I am translating literally from the Hungarian), "Haven’t you heard?
Stalin has farted himself out of the ranks of the living." For this gross indiscretion, our loose
tongued neighbor disappeared that night. He returned a year later.
He was not the only one to disappear around that time (we had had an ample number of
neighbors disappear in the previous few months; nobody needed an explanation of what had
transpired!). On the very day our "great liberator" Comrade Stalin died, my father was arrested.
Two weeks after his arrest, my mother lost what would have been my sister. For six months, my
mother and I did not know if my father was alive. After six months, we found out that indeed he
was alive; my mother received visiting privileges. She found out the charges against my father:
libeling the name of Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili Stalin!
Although the new Prime Minister, Imre Nagy, had granted an amnesty to all political
prisoners, the AVO, the Hungarian state security police and the staunchest supporters of Mátyás
Rákosi, Hungary’s Stalinist leader, proud holder of the titles of "Stalin’s best disciple" and
"father of the Hungarian people," still secretary general of the party and until June, 1953 Prime
Minister as well, did everything in their power to prevent the actual release of political prisoners.
My father was one of countless others caught in the wedge of the power struggle.
My mother persisted. She went daily to the offices of the Ministry of Interior under
whose jurisdiction the AVO supposedly operated. She finally contacted an attorney of Jewish
origin whom she and my father had saved during the war. Although not a Communist, he had
connections in the hierarchy of the party. My father came home in December, 1953. His 5'2"
frame had shrunk from his chunky 160 lbs. to 70 lbs; his left ear drum was broken, most of his
teeth were missing, his hair had turned white. I did not recognize him.
During his imprisonment, my mother and I were shunned by our neighbors and friends.
Painful as this was, lonely and isolated as we felt, exactly what the authorities wanted the
families of political prisoners to feel, we understood. Guilt by association with the family of a
known "enemy of the people" could easily lead to one’s arrest. And people had been hanged for
less!
There was one family that was an exception to this shunning: an orthodox Jewish family,
who lived down the street, most of the members of which had perished at Auschwitz, befriended
us. They brought over food, and provided companionship and support. My mother cautioned

them about the danger of associating with us. Éva Grosz, wife, the tiny mother of two, replied
that they were not going to allow anyone to experience the kind of abandonment her and her
husband’s family had experienced during the war. She and my mother became best friends; I
became best friends with her son Robi, who was a year older. I have never forgotten their
kindness.
In the Hungary of the time, less than a decade after the end of the brutal reign of terror on
the part of the Arrow Cross, the Hungarian fascist party whose members were still obsessed with
shooting Jews into the Danube as the Red Army was laying siege to Budapest, there were strong
undercurrents of anti-Semitism. I remember a song, popular on the streets, rendered as though
the singer was a Jewish concentration camp survivor, about how wonderful the conditions had
been and how old Mrs. Weiss, who had died of old age, was the only one not to return from
Auschwitz. Moreover, in the top of the leadership of the Communist Party, not only Rákosi but
the three other most influential leaders, Ernö Gerö, Minister of Industry, József Révai, Minister
of Culture, and Mihály Farkas, Minister of Defense, were all Jewish. It was also well known that
the investigators of the AVO had been recruited by Rákosi from the ranks of young, orphaned
survivors of the Nazi death camps bent on vengeance. Some Hungarians felt that the terrible
Stalinist reign of terror in Hungary 1949-1953 was nothing more than the perpetration of Jewish
vengeance far out of proportion to the horrors inflicted on the Jewish population during the
period of Nazi domination!
In this regard, George Schöpflin, referring to the more immediate post-war period but no
less applicable to the era of Rákosi’s reign of terror, has written:
There had been a connection between the left and Jews from the early years of the
century and the popular identification with Jews--well exploited by the interwar regime-had created the stereotype figure of the Judaeo-Boshevik in the eyes of many people.
From this it was an easy step to regard communism as a Jewish device, especially in the
aftermath of the Holocaust for which the responsibility of non-Jewish Hungarians had not
been clarified then or later. This confusion of attitudes was exacerbated by the
communists' no less deliberate reliance on cadres of Jewish background to undertake the
anti-fascist purification of Hungarian life.

He explains further:
"From the communists’ point of view, Jews were absolutely reliable in this role
because by no stretch of the imagination could they have been tainted with Nazism. From
the non-Jewish and non-communist majority standpoint, the prosecution of war criminals
by Jews could and did assume the appearance of a Jewish revenge, because their other
qualifications for this role seems less salient. The entire question of reciprocal attitudes,
Jewish and non-Jewish, communist and non-communist, remained as a kind of semivisible undercurrent throughout the post-war period of Hungarian history and surfaced
only occasionally."

However, the whole set of relations, between Jew and non-Jew, Communist and non-

Communist, was even more complicated. For one thing, Rákosi was keenly aware of Stalin’s
purges of Jews in the late ‘40s, early ‘50s in the entire Soviet bloc (the trial of the Jewish doctors
involved in the famous "doctors’ plot" to assassinate Stalin, which probably would have
unleashed a fresh round of purges whose targets would be Jews throughout the Eastern bloc, was
forestalled only by the Soviet leader’s death). He was always afraid of the anti-Semitism of the
Soviet leader and other members of "the inner circle," particularly Lavrenti Beria. This was one
of the most important factors motivating his obsession with showing that he was "Stalin’s best
disciple."
Secondly, in a move difficult to top in its utter Stalinist cynicism, if Rákosi recruited the
investigators of the AVO from the ranks of embittered death camp survivors, he had the AVO’s
torturers and executioners recruited from the fascist Arrow Cross’ most fanatical and cruel
members. No less ironic was turning the dreaded former headquarters of the Arrow Cross at 60
Andrássy Ave (renamed Stalin Ave; nobody in my neighborhood called it by that name!) into the
dreaded headquarters of the AVO!
The two groups, investigators of Jewish origin and torturers/jailers with a compromised
Arrow Cross past, as well as a third of group of draftees from the rural areas who served
primarily as border guards, were kept isolated from each other, the respective background of its
members a tightly guarded secret. But just in case, Rákosi was always ready to play these groups
off against each other.
Beyond this, the "father of the Hungarian people," in spite of his Jewish origins, was not
beyond using anti-Semitic rhetoric for political gain. As anti-Semitism was on the rise in 195152, there was at least one anti-Semitic Rákosi speech given to factory workers and broadcast on
national radio (preserved in historical archives).
Within three months of the death of Stalin, Imre Nagy replaced Rákosi as Prime Minister
although the latter was allowed to retain his position as General Secretary of the Party. Popular
among the Hungarian population, Nagy brought a number of political and personal skills to his
new job. To the Soviet leadership, not the least of his skills and qualifications was the fact that
among the old "Muscovites" he was the only gentile!
An epic power struggle, in part reflecting, in part deviating from the power struggles in
the Kremlin, ensued between Nagy the reformer and Rákosi the hardliner, who still controlled
the party apparatus. Rákosi eventually won, obtaining the backing of the Soviet leadership (after
Malenkov’s fall from power), and gathering sufficient strength to have Nagy expelled first from
the leadership, then the Party itself in 1955.
What amounted to an inter party opposition consisting of writers, journalists, young
intellectuals, some of them populists, a disproportionate number of them of Jewish origin,
gathered around Nagy (who always rejected the term inter party opposition). The fact that Rákosi
and his clique as well as most of the upper echelon of the AVO on the one side and
disproportionate numbers of "the Imre Nagy circle" were of Jewish origin made perfectly logical
sense to xenophobic anti-Semites then and now: it was all part of one big Jewish conspiracy to
control the world! Hitler could not have put it better!
Paradoxically, as the Soviet Union was de-Stalinizing, Hungary was re-Stalinizing!

Following the XXth Party Congress at which Khrushchev denounced "the crimes of Stalin,"
things began to unravel in Hungary (and Poland): the Petofi Circle, a group of young
intellectuals much of the leadership of which came from "Nagy circle" and, once again, a
disproportionate number of whom were Jewish, held their much heralded debates on topics
previously taboo in the Communist world (freedom of the press); Rákosi was finally relieved of
the leadership in July, 1956 and replaced by Gerö, who was, without the trappings of "the cult of
personality," no less a Stalinist than his predecessor; and László Rajk and his fellow victims of
the anti-Titorist purges were ceremoniously reburied. Attended by a crowd of 200,000, the
funeral turned into a mass protest. Sitting on my father’s desk, I listened to every drum roll,
every word of every eulogy and every speech on the radio.
Seventeen days later, on October 23, 1956, the Hungarian Revolution erupted; the giant
statue of Stalin, on the pedestal of which was inscribed "To our Great Liberator, from the
Hungarian people," was toppled; Gerö was removed from power and Imre Nagy became the
Prime Minister. By October 28, Nagy announced the withdrawal of Soviet troops. My father and
I watched them to do so -- from nearly the same spot, among others, in front of the Yugoslav
Embassy from which Nagy and his entourage would be abducted on November 22! Within three
days, the new Prime Minister had formed a truly multi-party cabinet, withdrew Hungary from the
Warsaw Pact, and declared the country’s neutrality.
I still have an occasional nightmares about the rudest awakening of my life in the early
hours of the morning November 4: the earth, the house were shaking to the sound of cannon fire
and tanks rumbling down the street; the voice of Imre Nagy came on the radio announcing that
the Soviet Union had invaded Hungary.
The Kádár government, which for all of its well deserved later reputation for reform,
came to Budapest in a Soviet tank, would later claim, especially at the trial of Imre Nagy, that
there were numerous instances of Jewish persecution and that, had not Soviet troops intervened,
a massive, well organized pogrom would have occurred. There is no evidence for either of these
claims. What we do know is that there were disproportionate number of Jews among the ranks of
the freedom fighters just as there were among the intellectuals who, with the Workers’ Councils,
spearheaded the passive resistance to the Soviet occupation and the new government. The last
person executed during the post-’56 reprisals, László Nickelsburg, had served a three year prison
sentence, was retried, and sentenced to death. He was accused of leading a group of dedicated
former fascists who were seeking to bring about an Arrow Cross restoration. Nickelsburg was
Jewish; nearly all of his allegedly ex-fascist "band" were between the ages of 13 and 18, making
the oldest seven years old in the waning days of Arrow Cross rule.
Shortly after November 4, Éva, Robi and the rest of the Grosz family fled to Austria. We
obtained permission to move into their apartment in December (the family encouraged us to do
so, prior to their escape). We received several letters from them, then lost contact. Their letters
could not have reached us; my father, mother, and I crossed into Yugoslavia on January 21, 1957
at about the same time that the successors of the AVO were ringing the doorbell at the Grosz
apartment into which we had moved.
These personal and historical recollections and reflections provide the context and the
existential motivation for the topic of this paper, "The Secular Spirituality of Former Eastern
Bloc Dissidents," within the parameters of the theme of this session, "Post-Holocaust, Post-

Gulag Religious Experience." I have always had a fascination for what I consider to be one of
the most admirable features of the lives of former Eastern Bloc dissidents, namely their
unremitting commitment and courage regardless of any potential danger to their persons. Most of
the former of the dissidents were former Marxists whose commitment to the utopian ideals of
communism and the discipline of the party, and later to the cause of human rights and
oppositional activity had a religious, spiritual, ascetic quality. A disproportionate number of
them were Jews for whom, if they were old enough, their actual experiences during the
Holocaust, and if they were of the post-war generation, the retrieval of the historic memory of
that monstrous evil coupled with experiencing the Gulag in the broadest sense of the term shaped
their unequivocal commitments. My illustration’s will focus largely on the former Democratic
Opposition in Hungary, including its efforts to retrieve and reinterpret the Revolution of 1956 by
means of which it questioned the legitimacy of the communist regime. More briefly, I shall draw
parallels to the key figures of Adam Michnik in Poland and Vaclev Havel in the former
Czechoslovakia. In addition to analyzing the religious and spiritual quality of the former
dissidents’ commitment and dedication, I shall highlight the challenges such a secular spirituality
poses for the development of a post-Holocaust, post-Gulag theology.
I.
In her Pulitzer Prize winning The Haunted Land: Facing Europe’s Ghosts After
Communism, Tina Rosenberg has perceptively written that much more than a rewriting of the
past is occurring in Central and Eastern Europe:
"This is more than a debate over the past. The struggle to define the past is one of
the most important ways eastern Europeans compete for control of the present."

Alluding to George Orwell’s statement to the effect that "whoever controls the past controls the
future," she firmly asserts that "the memory of the past is a prize worth struggling for." She
writes:
"Nations, like individuals, need to face up to and understand traumatic past events
before they can put them aside and move on to normal life. This is important for the
victims, who can truly heal and resume their contributions to society only when their
dignity and suffering have been officially acknowledged. But it is just as important for
the collaborators. Preventing dictatorship’s return requires a full understanding of the
mechanisms of dictatorship. How did communism win the complicity of ordinary, wellintentioned, even idealistic people to horrible crimes?"

61.5 To be sure, Rosenberg is acutely aware that the reinterpretation of the past involves
winners and losers, one foreign occupation replacing another and/or a nation gaining its
independence and sovereignty, and the ups and downs different elements and interests in the
course of upheaval. But more importantly, there are fundamental values and differences in
fundamental values at stake in the reinterpretation of the past (something that is not new in the
histories of the peoples of Central/Eastern Europe and Russia and the other successor states!).
And what precisely is at stake in the reinterpretation of the past in the postcommunist period is

rather basic:
"A nation’s decisions about how to face its past are central to the challenge of
building real democracy... How they treat the past is becoming the first important
measure of whether they will put these ideals into practice, the first extended test of the
new governments’ system of justice, level of political tolerance, guarantees of rights, and
rule of law."

In Hungary, one of the focal points of the activities of the Democratic Opposition that
was formed in the late ‘70s and gained strength throughout the ‘80s concerned the official
interpretation and assessment of the Revolution of 1956. János Kádár, Party Secretary who was
in power from 1956 to 1988, had attained a considerable degree of popular support as a result of
economic reforms ("goulash Communism") that from 1968 through most of the ‘70s made
Hungary the most prosperous country in the Eastern bloc. Moreover, in spite of sometimes
tortuous shifts in cultural policy, Hungary (along with Poland, except during martial law) was the
most politically open and pluralistic of these countries," the happiest barrack in the block." By
1985, Parliamentary elections featured not only several Communist candidates running for the
same seat (and debating such issues as how to balance the budget!) but non-Communist as well!
But there was a very high price for all of this. The presence of Soviet troops on
Hungarian soil was an unquestionable given. Hungarian foreign policy was in effect a
mouthpiece for the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. In what is more than an ironic twist of
history, Hungarian troops participated in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August,
1968!
No less important (and inseparable from the issue of the presence of Soviet troops) was
the official assessment of the events of 1956. Within a few weeks of the suppression of the
uprising and the formation of the Kádár government, Kádár proclaimed the insurrection a
"counterrevolution;" as mentioned previously, later propaganda would claim that the Soviet
interference and a new government were necessary because of, among other reasons, planned
systematic anti-Jewish pogroms and persecution of innocent Communists. The reprisals that
followed were the worst in Hungarian history. There are 452 documented cases of court imposed
executions being carried out, with at least another 1500 summary executions during the course of
the revolution and in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion. Tens of thousands were
imprisoned, their employment often tenuous after their release, and later frequently deprived of
their old age pensions on account of their "criminal" past. For all of Kádár’s popularity and
attempts at reform, it was difficult to ignore the fact that he started his long "reign" as "the
Butcher of Budapest;" his legitimacy was established by the tank and the gallows. Of course, this
was not something that could be talked about -- except as a "counterrevolution" whose
participants were "bandits and murderers!"
Like dissidents throughout the Eastern bloc, members of Hungary’s Democratic
Opposition attempted to "live in truth" -- a concept I shall explore at greater length below -- and
by so doing exposing "the lie" which was the ideological basis of "post- totalitarian" regimes.
For them, one of the focal points of "living in truth" concerned the truth regarding the events of
1956. This was for the sake of the truth itself and living in it. But by so doing, they realized they

were undermining the guiding premises and the very legitimacy of the regime.
Given the theme of this session, the focus of my discussion will be the figure of the
executed freedom fighter István Angyal, and the manner in which his memory was (and is) kept
alive and used as part of their attempt to live in truth (then and now).
Angyal was born in Magyarbánhegyes on October 14, 1928. His father made shoelaces,
his mother was a homemaker. Being Jews, Angyal, his mother, and two sisters were deported to
Auschwitz, where the mother perished in 1944 (I have not found any references to the manner of
his father’s death although, apparently, he managed to survive the war). One of his most
formative experiences was being forced as a sixteen year old to watch the public hanging of one
of his sisters on account of her aborted escape. Angyal, who was never secretive about his Jewish
origins, rarely talked about this to his friends, nor did he mention it in his written prison
confessions and his oral interrogations lest he be given preferential treatment. In light of what I
have written about Jewish Hungarian involvement in the Revolution of 1956 and as victims of
the ensuing reprisals, in my view this would have been more than highly unlikely.
Angyal returned from Auschwitz a dedicated communist committed to a messianic faith
in the vocation of scientific socialism to create a society which would end oppression based on
nationality, race, and class in all its forms. But his communism was always with a small "c"; at
no time did he join the Party. In fact, although he had two years of a university education
specializing in philosophy, Angyal’s goal in life was to become "a good worker." And indeed, he
was a skilled worker who labored with heavy iron works, construction, and automobile building
in the road construction department of Budapest (during this time, he was married, had a son,
was divorced). In 1952 and 1953, he was a "stahanovite," in the Stalinist propaganda of the time,
"a model worker."
As profoundly shaped as he was by witnessing the gruesome execution of his sister,
Angyal never exhibited any signs of rancor, vindictiveness, or desire for vengeance; he wanted a
new order of the world where such things would not happen and he was convinced that
communism would bring about such a world.
As his biographer and editor of his prison confessions, the poet and writer István Eörsi, a
major figure in the Democratic Opposition as well as postcommunist politics, along with
numerous others, has shown that it was the workers who experienced foremost the discrepancy
between the conditions under which they were living and the vision of communism, let alone the
proclamations concerning what had been attained on the part of Stalinist propaganda. In
Angyal’s case, the disillusionment that resulted from this discrepancy was exhibited by his
hanging his picture of Stalin upside down next to his toilet as early as 1950! Although a gesture
fraught with great danger, it was hardly one of open, vocal defiance; Angyal merely acted as
though this was the most natural place the likeness of "the Great Liberator" belonged!
Angyal’s behavior during the Revolution of 1956 and after right up to his execution is
nothing short of remarkable. On October 23, he participated in the demonstrations that served as
the catalyst for the uprising. In his prison confessions, he describes fondly how he marched arm
in arm with the likes of Tibor Déry, Communist novelist close to the "Nagy circle," József Gáli,
another prominent writer, Angyal’s good friend Per Olaf Csongovai, Imre Sinkovits, the popular
actor, and the writer István Csurka. The affectionate tone is rather ironic in the case of the latter

two individuals; in the postcommunist era they have both been notable for their ultra-nationalist,
anti-Semitic sentiments; although I am not aware of either of them making anti-Semitic or
otherwise derogatory remarks about the person of Angyal, they have at times been allied with
former ‘56 freedom fighters who have thought Angyal and his freedom fighters were too far to
the left to be authentic representatives of the revolution (in ‘95, a major controversy surrounded
the building of a statue honoring the freedom fighters and whose symbol was to be Angyal. It
was decided that he would not be a representative figure because of his "leftism;" Peter
Mansfeld, imprisoned until he turned 18 and executed three days later, was chosen instead); and
in historical usage, calling someone a "leftist" a Bolshevik, a "liberal," was synonymous with
calling them a Jew.
Angyal was elected commander by the freedom fighters in Tüzoltó ("Firefighter Street"),
with Csongovai as his second-in- command. They were one street over and parallel to the Killian
barracks which in turn was across the Corvin passage with its famous movie theatre. The three
locations were of the utmost importance: they controlled access to the downtown area, to two of
the bridges across the Danube, and, in the other direction, the airport outside of Budapest.
Angyal organized strategy and delegated a variety of tasks. He spent much of his time
gathering accurate information (in Budapest and the rest of the country rumors were running
rampant), and making contact with other groups of freedom fighters, especially Pál Maléter, the
tank commander who took charge of the Killian barracks, and Gergely Pongrátz, leader of the
large insurgent group at Corvin alley. He also helped in the production and distribution of flyers,
and led a demonstration in Heroes’ Square protesting the massacre of unarmed demonstrators in
Kossuth Square in front of the Parliament Building.
Above all, Angyal wanted a peaceful resolution to the conflict, a feat that could be
accomplished only if the government recognized the insurgency as a revolution, not a
counterrevolution as it had repeatedly proclaimed on the radio, as socialist and democratic, and if
Soviet troops withdrew from Hungarian soil. To this end, he went to the Parliament Building to
meet with Imre Nagy, János Kádár, new General Secretary of the Party, and Ferenc Münnich, the
Interior Minister. He participated in the meeting and negotiations at which Nagy met with the
leaders of the various groups of freedom fighters. Angyal also participated in the meeting during
which the National Guard, which sought to integrate those elements of the armed forces and
police that were loyal to the revolution with the freedom fighters, was formed.
As a commander, Angyal tried to make sure that captured AVO officers were not harmed
or suffered any reprisals; he had them kept as prisoners with the hope that under a new
government it would be the courts, strictly adhering to due process of law, that would determine
their guilt or innocence. He also tried to insure that, as economic life ground to a halt, stores
would not be looted.
Most moving of all of Angyal’s activities was the distribution of food and medicine,
donated by bakers, store managers, and pharmacists, to people in the neighborhood -- including
the family of an AVO agent who infiltrated the group, was discovered, and subsequently released
on Angyal’s orders! And no less striking, especially for the leader of a group of freedom fighters,
he is described as weaponless on several instances by witnesses.
If all of this sounds like hagiography, it is more than striking that Angyal’s

contemporaries and fellow freedom fighters, including Pongrátz and Jeno Fonay, with whom
Angyal shared a cell in the "death house," now associated with members of freedom fighter
organizations who, then and now, objected to the Tüzoltó utca commander’s "communism" and
"leftism," grounds, in their view, for disqualifying him as a representative figure of the
Revolution, unequivocally testify to the veracity of the descriptions of his extraordinary courage,
sense of fairness, and compassion.
It is interesting to note that Angyal, in varying degrees, shared the opinion of some of
these people about some of the luminaries of the Revolution: he did not trust Maléter because he,
like Prongrátz to this day, believed that Maléter had ordered his troops to fire on the freedom
fighters. This is a matter of considerable controversy in Hungary, especially among the so-called
"56-ers," intensified by Maléter’s status as a hero and martyr of the Revolution. Some of
Maléter’s former associates, especially Peter Gosztonyi who after escaping to the West in ‘56
became a renowned historian in Switzerland, and such biographers as Miklós Horvath have
attempted to show rather convincingly that Maléter never gave such an order, although
admittedly in the beginning there was fighting between the two groups.
In similar fashion, Angyal, like his detractors then and now, was distrustful of Nagy
because of the Prime Minister’s repeated radio requests for the freedom fighters to lay down
their arms. In the case of the commander of the Tüzoltó utca freedom fighters, there was another,
equally strong reason for the distrust: as Nagy was creating a multi-party cabinet, the politicians
of the old political parties were already jockeying for position and prestige, a phenomenon
Angyal deemed to be an affront to the freedom fighters who were shedding their blood and who,
in his estimation, needed the nation’s solidarity and sense of unity rather the diffusion created by
the proliferation of political parties. The leaders of these political parties were already acting like
would be "feudal lords" of old, and Nagy was enabling them to do so, catering to their whims.
A few days after the Soviet invasion of November 4, Angyal, like the mothers of young
freedom fighters, felt that, given the odds, continuing the armed resistance was futile, yet it was a
cowardly, conceding of the legitimacy of the invasion, to surrender directly to the Soviets.
Consequently, like most freedom fighters, he and his group stopped fighting, discarding weapons
in a variety of assorted places. Angyal, perhaps naively but still with a gesture of eloquent
dignity, distributed flyers written in Russian that quoted Marx’s statement about how "a people
that subjugates another cannot itself be truly free" and Lenin’s statements affirming the right to
national self-determination. On November 7, the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution and
the greatest holiday throughout the Eastern bloc, he waved two flags at Soviet tanks, one the
symbol of the Revolution, the traditional Hungarian tricolor of red, white, and green, bordered by
black in memory of freedom fighters who had died in the fighting, with a hole in the middle
where the Stalinist emblem had been, and the traditional communist red flag with star and
hammer and sickle in gold. Some of the people in the neighborhood were extremely upset at the
two flags being waved together, feeling that the communist flag sullied everything the
Revolution stood for. But for Angyal, his actions embodied some of his basic beliefs: Stalinism
and even post-Stalinist Communist rule in the entire Soviet bloc was a fundamental betrayal of
communism; the Hungarian Revolution, while to be a sure a national rebellion against foreign
domination, was equally fundamentally a socialist and democratic revolt against this betrayal;
consequently, flying the flag of the Revolution and the communist flag symbolized the continuity
between the Russian and Hungarian Revolutions, that the Hungarian freedom fighters of ‘56

were the authentic heirs of the Bolshevik Revolution!
The leader of the Tüzoltó utca freedom fighters also participated in the passive resistance
that followed the suppression of the uprising and that was spearheaded by the Workers’
Councils. Operating secretly out of the hospital on Sándor Peterffy utca, he and such writers as
István Eörsi produced and distributed flyers and newspapers in "samizdat" form. During this
time, dating back to the first days of the Revolution, Angyal was quite sick: he was diagnosed
with pneumonia but "escaped" from the hospital! He managed to keep going with the help of
caffeine pills.
István Angyal was arrested at the aforementioned hospital on November 16, 1956. Once
the incriminating flyers were found, he tried to distribute them to his captors. In fact, he had
packed a suitcase full of them as he had been preparing for the inevitable.
Upon being arrested on unspecified charges and being taken to jail, he immediately
requested a hearing. In fact, all of the prisoners on his floor took up a chant in unison to give
István Angyal a hearing. In his first written statement, alluding to his activities during the
Revolution, he stated "in 1956 I became an excellent worker."
Angyal’s prison confessions have to be considered among the most remarkable
documents written in prison. First of all, it is a memorable, passionate yet self-effacing account
of one person’s recollection of his participation in the events of ‘56. Second, it is a powerful and
moving indictment of János Kádár and his regime.
In his description of his role in the Revolution, Angyal describes how, in contrast to his
distrust of Imre Nagy, his greatest confidence was in János Kádár, head of the party even during
the revolution, of working class background himself, and who related well and easily to workers.
The freedom fighter met with Kádár twice in the Parliament Building during the Revolution. On
one of those occasions, they talked for three hours, Angyal (and Csongovai) urging the party
boss to lead the Party into the forefront of the Revolution rather than fighting it, and inviting him
to visit the group in Tüzoltó utca. Kádár promised to do so. He never did.
It was very difficult for Angyal to accept the fact the party leader he trusted and
respected, who was so clearly on the side of the Revolution, betrayed it, and became the chief
symbol of its suppression. In this regard, Eörsi claims that Angyal’s conduct during his
imprisonment and trial, including his prison confessions, follows the pattern of a Greek tragedy.
The commander of Tüzoltó utca knew that the only chance for his life to be spared would have to
be clemency from Kádár himself. However, for Kádár to do that, he would have to acknowledge
that the uprising was a legitimate revolution and not the counterrevolution of his consolidationist
propaganda. Since the Party Secretary was obviously unwilling to do so, and Angyal unrepentant
and unrelenting, Eörsi thinks there was a fated logic to the course of events; Angyal knew too
much about Kádár’s actual behavior during the revolution not to be eliminated.
The most striking feature of Angyal’s prison confessions, in my view, is its remarkable if
uneven quality as a political treatise. Thoughtful, erudite, with an amplitude of quotes from
Marx, Lenin, and numerous greats of Hungarian history (i.e., Petofi) without the benefit of the
availability of books, it is a remarkable statement of grassroots, participatory socialism,
"communism," characterized by workers’ self-governance and national self-determination.

Angyal’s vision combines elements of anarchism, "libertarian socialism," especially of the
Hungarian variety, and Trotskyism in a way that is deeply rooted in Hungary’s historical and
cultural context. And if that sounds contradictory, one can hardly expect the consistency of an
academic paper given at the American Academy of Religion from a prison confession, especially
given the harsh and cruel conditions of Angyal’s incarceration!
If the political language of Angyal’s treatise sounds anachronistic in the postcommunist
era, it was certainly current and creative in 1956. Not only was his use of Marxist categories and
of "communism" within the parameters of official political discourse, he used it creatively to
show not only how short the regime had fallen short of but contradicted in cynical fashion its
own professed ideals, anticipating the later intellectual critique of future dissidents. Most
importantly, the unitive thread of Angyal’s political ruminations is the problem of freedom
developed in light of the freedom fighter’s fundamental experiences of the denial of freedom
under fascism, Stalinism, and post-Stalinist Communism, and the quest for a new and different
world of freedom. In addition to personal memories, it is this focus on freedom, based on the
experience of the lack of it, that provides the basic link between Angyal and members of the later
Democratic Opposition, such as Eörsi, long after the latter abandoned his Marxism in favor of
liberalism.
At this point, given the theme of this session, it is worth reiterating that although Angyal
never mentioned his experiences during the Holocaust either in his written or oral confessions,
nevertheless these experiences left an indelible mark on him, and were certainly among the
prime factors motivating him to seek a different world. The depth and intensity of the impact of
witnessing his sister’s hanging is evident in the prison doctor’s medical report: Angyal was
unable to eat for a long (unspecified) period of time, and his capacity for social contact was
severely limited. It is a jarring experience to read this part of the report. The prison doctor also
wrote that in the normal course of life Angyal had resolved the psychological trauma of his
teenage years, that there was nothing to prevent his being held accountable for his actions, no
psychological condition to prevent his execution.
István Angyal was tried in two cases. Sentenced to death on April 7, 1958 in the first, he
seemed to waver during his "right to the last word" in his confidence in the revolution, admitting
to a discrepancy between his intentions and the unintended consequences of his actions, and that
there may have been "imperialist elements" involved in the uprising. Tried again and sentenced
to death again on November 20, 1958, there was no wavering this time in his "right to the last
word;" admitting no wrongdoing, he said that according to the norms of the Kádár regime, in
effect no different from the Arrow Cross or Rakosi regimes, he deserved death. Summarizing his
most formative experiences and fundamental love and focus on freedom, he said:

"I did not know within myself any desire for power. I did not want to lead men, I
merely wanted to be a citizen. I always considered myself first and foremost a citizen, the
laws until 1945 meant death for me, in many instances they meant this after 1945 as well.
In between the two legalities I sought justice (author’s note: the Hungarian word
"igazság" can be translated as both truth and justice). I did not find it. I wanted to be a
free man, I cannot live in prison. I ask the court to let its judgment stand because it
proved such facts to weigh on me that deserve death." (Translation is my own.)

István Angyal was hanged on December 1, 1958.
II.
Upon being released from prison on August 19, 1960, István Eörsi stared for a long time
at the large building; his friend István Angyal, then the rest of those who had been murdered
behind the walls came to mind. He remembered those he left behind and recalls feeling like an
escapee: he pledged loyalty to the dead.
There were many (and just how many would be clear only after June 16, 1989!) who like
Eörsi, kept the memory of 1956 and its martyrs alive. This was especially the case with those
who lost friends and family in the fighting and/or the reprisals. But during the more than thirty
two years the uprising was labeled a counterrevolution or ignored, the price paid for the
prosperity and relative freedom of the Kádár era was a "collective amnesia" concerning 1956 -- a
collective amnesia that seemed to afflict even those who kept secretly the memory. Disturbing
this collective amnesia and awakening collective historical memory were among the primary
objectives of the later Democratic Opposition.
Before discussing the pertinent dynamics concerning the make-up, worldviews, and
political activities of the Democratic Opposition, I need to point out that martyrs of the
Revolution like Angyal were both precursors, forerunners and role models for the dissidents. As
mentioned previously, the use of Marxist categories to expose the hypocritical discrepancy
between the professed ideals and claimed achievements of the regime anticipated the later
critiques of the future dissidents. The overarching experience of the lack of freedom and the
struggle for a different world of freedom, even with the transformation of political philosophies
and orientations, provides the most powerful bond, the strongest point of linkage across the
decades, between freedom fighters like Angyal and the Democratic Opposition. And their
respective commitments to the cause of freedom, to "living in truth" was unswerving,
unequivocal, exhibiting a virtual dare devil attitude that ignored any adverse consequences to
one’s safety and well being.
Like Angyal, most of the dissidents acting in the Democratic Opposition were of Jewish
origin. The older members, such as Miklós Vásárhelyi, were already adults during World War II
and had adult memories of the Holocaust. Others, like the writer György Konrád who in such
autobiographical novels as A Feast in the Garden describes his experiences through the use of
gripping flashbacks, were teenagers (like Angyal) for whom the Holocaust was, needless to say,
decisively formative of their identity and life orientation.
For the generation born during and after World War II, this entire dynamic was far more
complex. It was not at all unusual, for example, for parents to conceal from their children their
Jewish origins. A vivid instance of this is the case of Miklós Haraszti, the last person tried for a
political crime in Hungary (1973), a major figure in the Democratic Opposition and in the
postcommunist period, one of the parliamentary leaders of the Alliance of Free Democrats until
his "retirement" from politics in 1994 (while still in his mid-40s); he did not even know what a
Jew was until he asked his parents the meaning of the derogatory names his classmates in
elementary school had been calling him!
Hiding one’s Jewishness, a historic "defense mechanism" on the part of some Jews in

Hungary, has become a widespread phenomenon since World War II. The practical impact on
dissidents of Jewish origin born after World War II has been that, in addition to dealing with the
"shock" of finding out the meaning of derogatory images and stereotypes associated with a
people in whom they have at least biological roots, they have had to retrieve quite intentionally
and self-consciously the historic memory of the Holocaust (as well as the rest of complex history
of the interrelationship between Jews and non-Jews in Hungary, especially since the early 19th
century).
For dissidents, at least in their own estimation, the retrieval of the historic memory of the
Holocaust did not establish and enhance their self-consciousness as Jews. Rather, it became part
of an overarching panorama of oppression, domination, the lack of freedom as they became
aware of and retrieved no less self-consciously the historic memory of the experiences of the
Gulag in the broadest sense of the term.
Like Angyal, the members of the Democratic Opposition who were of Jewish origin were
totally assimilated Jews. They were typical of the 85% of Hungary’s 100,000 Jews who do not
observe their religion or identify in any ostensibile way with those ethnic roots (religion and
ethnicity being two of the standard characteristics for being considered Jewish).
At the risk of digressing too much, I do feel the need to observe that such total
assimilation has been the most typical pattern of the relationship between Jewish Hungarians and
the wider culture at large. Indeed, the Jews of Hungary have long had the reputation of being the
world’s most assimilated. For in spite of my numerous references throughout this paper to the
long and complex history of anti-Semitism in Hungary, as István Deák has written, "perhaps
nowhere else in Europe were Jews more enthusiastically encouraged, at least in certain periods,
to become members of the national group, and probably nowhere else were Jews more willing to
become patriotic citizens.
I have made this digression for two reasons. The first has to do with the viciously antiSemitic claim that one cannot be a Jew and a loyal citizen of the country of one’s residence at the
same time; that is to say, one cannot be a Jew and a loyal Hungarian -- or Pole, German, Russian,
or American for that matter. As pernicious as this contention is, it is nevertheless one that was
part of the propaganda of the countries that had fascist governments and were allied with Nazi
Germany during part of the interwar period and World War II, and one that is still heard all too
often in the contemporary world -- including in the United States.
The second reason has to do with the fact that their being assimilated Jewish Hungarians
shaped their outlook on freedom, human rights, and, especially in the postcommunist period, the
all important issue of the rights of "Magyar" (the Hungarian word for Hungarian) minorities
"across the borders," in the adjacent nation-states. What I am driving at is that, unlike an Elie
Wiesel, no less a spokesperson for universal human rights, who retrieved not only memory of
monstrous evil but the particularity of that evil in its attempt to eliminate the Jewish people from
the face of the earth and in the process recovering the particularity of his Eastern European
Jewish roots, the younger Jewish Hungarians of the Democratic Opposition, who never thought
of themselves as anything other than Magyars, while retrieving particularity of the experience of
Hungarian Jews during the Holocaust, did so without the recovery of their Jewish roots, and with
an ensuing emphasis on universal human rights rather than the particular rights of distinct
ethnic, national, and religious groups.

Just as they retrieved the historic memory of the Holocaust, so the younger dissidents of
Jewish origin retrieved the historic memory of the experience of the Gulag in the broadest sense
of the term, especially that of the Rákosi era. Of course, for some of them both Rákosi’s reign of
terror and the post ‘56 reprisals were childhood memories. But whether an actual childhood
and/or reconstructed historic memory, the dissidents uncovered the truth and developed, to use
Henry Nelson Wieman’s terminology, an ultimate commitment to "living in truth." And the
development of this ultimate commitment needs to be seen in terms of a "whole" of the retrieval
of the historic memory of the Holocaust and the Gulag, some personal memory of the experience
of the Gulag in the broadest sense of the term, and the experience of the discrepancy between the
professed ideals and even real achievements of the "soft dictatorship" that created "the happiest
barrack in the camp" and its actual political practices, which, no matter how surprisingly liberal
in terms of the norms of the Eastern bloc of that era, nevertheless drew carefully the parameters
of what was permissible.
One of the focal points of this "whole," as I have emphasized previously, was retrieval of
the truth about ‘56. For some of the younger dissidents, it was yet another major shock to
discover that their parents participated actively in the reprisals or that, at best, their behavior at
the time was ambiguous. Nevertheless, regardless of generation or what they uncovered,
including about their parents, they persisted in retrieving and telling the truth about ‘56.
For example, János Kis, a philosopher who was one of the founders and editor of Beszélö,
the oldest (established in 1981) and longest running illegal "samizdat" publication, leader of the
Alliance of Free Democrats (1989-91), wrote such seminal essays as "The End and the
Beginning," "Can 1956 Be Forgotten?," "The Restoration of 1956-57 in a Thirty Year
Perspective," and "The Present Crisis and its Origins" attempt both to retrieve the truth about the
Revolution and its suppression and link that truth to the system’s crisis in the ‘80s. In "The End
and the Beginning," Kis writes:

"Today we must remember the restoration not just in order to regain moral
integrity, but in order to understand that present political crisis of the regime. We have to
revive the tradition of resistance in order to overcome the political decay of our society.
We have to analyze former (failed) proposals of conciliation in order to find a more
effective compromise to our present and future (perhaps less hopeless) situation. The
events of 1956-57 developed from a moral issue into a political one."
As early as 1982, Beszélö devoted an entire issue to the historic memory of ‘56, containing
memorable interviews such as the one with Sándor Rácz, President of the Greater Budapest
Workers’ Councils in 1956. In addition, the dissidents attempted annually to hold a public
observance of the anniversary of the Revolution on October 23; as late as 1988, they would be
dispersed and/or arrested by truncheon wielding police.
A continuing thread in Kis and other dissident writers of Beszélö was that the Revolution
of 1956 was unfinished. Of course, they were acutely aware of the fact that the ‘80s (or for that
matter 1996) were not 1956. Nevertheless, they saw a thread of continuity in the need to struggle
ceaselessly for freedom, a struggle that, unlike the one in ‘56, was to be carried out by nonviolent means for both moral and political ("realpolitik") reasons.

Part of the thread of continuity between the two eras in the quest for freedom and the
search for ways of embodying that freedom was the concern to create institutional frameworks
that had the capacity to prevent the undue concentrations of power that were such a fundamental
feature of the dissidents’ lived experiences. While there was no uniformity in their formulations
of such institutional patterns, they were in general agreement that it meant the adaptation of
Western style liberal democratic political institutions: separation of powers and a system of
checks and balances between the various branches of government; truly free elections with
universal suffrage; and most importantly, legal protection and safeguarding of universal human
rights and civil liberties. Indeed, "constitutionalism," authentic legálity, the creation of a genuine
"rechtstaat" became one of the distinguishing hallmarks of the Democratic Opposition.
The members of the Democratic Opposition were no less critical of the undue
concentration of power in economic life and the complex way in which economic and political
power were intertwined in the communist system. They were equally aware of the complex
interrelationship between economic and political power in capitalist systems. During much of the
eighties, most of them favored some variation of democratic socialism. Retrieving the aspirations
and traditions of ‘56, with no small degree of nostalgia, most of them advocated economic
democracy, workers’ ownership and control of the enterprises and factories where they work.
A few were attracted by the late ‘70, early ‘80s to a Hayekian classical liberalism, more
closely resembling libertarianism. By the late ‘80s, most of the members of the Democratic
Opposition, which eventually became the political party named the Alliance of Free Democrats,
espoused some form of liberalism, which in the Central/Eastern Europe refers to an emphasis on
freedom of thought, constitutional limits on the power of the state, and the free market. Amidst
their diversity, most of them advocated free market mechanisms with a basic and stable social
safety net and had considerable sympathy for worker owned and managed enterprises. That is to
say, they retained their egalitarian sensibilities, "social democratic" sympathies, not in the sense
of retaining any confidence in socialism or the historic Social Democratic Parties that were
forced to fuse with the Communists, but in the sense of defending the need for a minimum, fair,
and stable social safety net in a free market economy that sought to maximize participation in
decision making, just as the institutions of liberal democracy sought to protect and embody
freedom as well as empower the participation of its citizens.
The publication of "The New Social Contract," written by János Kis, Otilia Solt, and
Ferenc Köszeg and published in Beszélö in 1987 was a truly epochal event in the Hungarian
dissident movement. In a deliberately Lockean fashion, it advocates the sovereignty of the
people, and the establishment of a constitutional system of checks and balances and separation of
powers. With regard to the economy, it vaguely called for the creation of workers’ councils to
realize the democratic dreams of ‘56. In fact, the document begins with the premise that the time
is ripe to attempt to realize the dreams of ‘56, in a new age and in a new way.
In the postcommunist period, the Alliance of Free Democrats which had emerged out of
the Democratic Opposition became the second largest political party and the main opposition
party to the right-center of coalition that ruled the country between 1990 and 1994. When István
Csurka, who had marched with István Angyal on October 23, 1956, vice-president of the
Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF), the major partner in the then ruling coalition, until his
expulsion from the party in 1993, engaged in anti-Semitic tirades, it was the Alliance of Free
Democrats that led the way in the public repudiation of anti-Semitism in Hungary’s political life.

And as the government drifted to the right and made authoritarian sounds, as 10,000 people
participated in an extreme right wing demonstration in September, ‘92, as the Csurkists gained
control of the electronic media in ‘93-’94 and seemingly displayed no great respect for
democracy, György Konrád, in no sense an acting in any official capacity for the Alliance of
Free Democrats but closely identified with it, organized with a number of others the Democratic
Charter, a grassroots, umbrella organization for a wide variety of groups that sought to defend
civil liberties; in response to the aforementioned rightwing demonstration, 100,000
demonstrators gathered under its aegis in defense of a "democracy without fear."
As in 1990, SZDSZ came in second during the elections of 1994. In spite of the fact that
the Socialists, one of the successor parties to the Communists (one that, in my view, bears little
resemblance to its predecessor, with its plurality of factions, open bickering, and implementation
of Thatcherite austerity measures) won an absolute parliamentary majority, they formed a
coalition with the Alliance of Free Democrats many of whose members were the Communists’
old nemesis. Some of the former members of Democratic Opposition -- most notably János Kis,
Miklós Haraszti, and Otilia Solt -- chose not to run for reelection. Some were uneasy with the
past of their coalition partners but recognized that ‘94 was not 1988 and 1956, that the reality of
the political situation for the SZDSZ, the Socialists, and the Hungarian nation made the
formation of the coalition not only a smart move politically but wise as well with respect to the
common good. Civil libertarians, pushing for more rapid privatization, austerity to stabilize the
inflation rate and to manage the huge international debt, most of the old Democratic
Oppositionists identified themselves as "social liberals," distrustful of all concentrations of
power, devoted to free thought, civil liberties, and a social egalitarianism that, in spite of the
austerity they proposed, was sensitive to the sufferings resulting form the massive economic
dislocations of the post-communist order, and grappled with the provision of a minimum safety
net in such order.
The journey of the former dissidents has been a long one, especially in the case of the
post-war generation whose parents were stalwart, loyal, obedient party members. If the journey
all three generations seems tortuous, their ideas contradictory in various phases of their
development, it is important to remember that the centrality of freedom, conceived in different
ways at different times, their preoccupation with undue concentrations of power, their
fundamental egalitarianism, and quest for political and economic participation, with due
acknowledgment of differences, have a thread of continuity with the traditions of the Revolution
of 1956. And both the traditions of the later dissidents and the freedom fighters of ‘56 have much
in common with what János Bák has called "libertarian socialism." And above all what the
members of the two groups in very different eras have in common is an unremitting devotion to
the cause of freedom for which they were willing to pay any price, including their lives.

III.
In this section, I shall briefly consider two former dissidents from two other former
Eastern bloc countries, Adam Michnik of Poland and Vaclev Havel of what was then
Czechoslovakia. Michnik’s life and thought closely parallels those of the younger generation of
Hungary’s former Democratic Opposition while Havel, a gentile profoundly shaped by the
historic memory of the Holocaust, provides the quintessential exemplification of the secular

spirituality of former Eastern bloc dissidents.
Born in 1946, Michnik came from a family of Jewish origin. Both of his parents were
devoted Communists. Although Michnik could look forward to a life of privilege, his father’s
avowed respect for the varied and critical traditions of the pre-war Polish Left and disdain for the
post-war institutionalization of Communist power was a profound influence on him. Other
formative influences, at least intellectually were Leszek Kolakowski, who was of "the generation
of October ‘56" that was instrumental in bringing the "national," reform Communist Wladyslaw
Gomulka to power (the Hungarian Revolution of ‘56 started on October 23 with demonstrations
that were intended as gestures of solidarity with the Polish people) and who at that stage of
development was a reform minded critical Marxist bent on expanding the reforms toward
political pluralism, human rights, and social justice; and Jacek Kuron, who with Karol
Modezelewski in their "An Open Letter to the Party" in 1964 (by which time Kolakowski was
openly siding with these dissident Marxist students) critiqued the oppression and exploitation of
workers under the Eastern bloc’s "managerial socialism" and advocated workers’ ownership
(genuine social ownership) of the means of production much in the manner of István Angyal and
the Workers’ Councils of the Hungarian Revolution of ‘56.
But for Michnik, who had first been arrested in 1965, the most decisive events were the
student demonstrations of 1968, which, needless to say, were severely repressed. Intellectuals
like Kolakowski were not only expelled from the party but exiled. The government engaged in a
vicious anti-Semitic campaign that led to the flight of most of what was left of Poland’s postHolocaust Jewish population; less than 5,000 Jews live in postcommunist Poland.
Michnik stayed, was arrested, and received a three year prison term. In 1976, in the wake
of arrests of workers following the Radom riots, he and Kuron among others, founded the
Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR). He was always a mediating figure, and advocated the
collaboration of the left with the Roman Catholic Church in defending human rights and the
creation of some modicum of space for civil society.
In the days of Solidarity (1980-81), Michnik, along with Kuron, became one of the
advisors Lech Walesa. Following the imposition of martial law, he spent three years in prison.
By the late ‘70s he had traversed the road form Marxism to a libertarian type of democratic
socialism or, perhaps more aptly, "liberal communitarianism." During the Roundtable
Negotiations that led to Poland’s first postcommunist elections in 1989, Michnik was one of the
key negotiators. As the new postcommunist age was about to dawn, with all due respect and
appreciation for the person and achievements of Walesa, the political alliance between the two
men came to an end. Michnik since then has been the editor of a "liberal" newspaper (in the
Central/Eastern European sense). He is one of the few defenders (and, in fact, now a friend) of
General Jaruzelki, Michnik’s one time jailer now on trial for treason.
During the Communist period (1968 and after), Michnik was the subject of direct
government sponsored anti-Semitic attacks, personal attacks that would be continued by his
detractors during the postcommunist period. It was in this context and in the very country where
Auschwitz is located that the retrieval of the historical memory of the Holocaust came alive for
him --probably even more vividly than for his Hungarian counterparts. Like the Hungarian
dissidents of Jewish origin, Michnik is totally assimilated and does not think of himself as
anything other than a Pole. And as is the case with these Hungarians, the Polish dissident’s

persistent defense of human rights has always been in terms of universal human rights and not
the particularity of these rights.
The following quotes from Michnik illustrate his ultimate commitment to freedom in a
manner reminiscent of the Hungarian dissidents we have considered previously:
"... the value of your participation cannot be gauged in terms of your chance of
victory but rather the value of your idea. In other words you score a victory not when you
win power but when you remain faithful to yourself."
"... By refusing to talk to the informer, and by choosing to be a political prisoner
you are defending hope. Not just hope within yourself and for yourself but also in others
and for others. You’re casting your declaration of hope out of your prison cell into the
world, like a sealed bottle into the ocean. If even one single person finds it, you will have
scored a victory."
"... it is not courage that makes me choose prison instead of banishment. If
anything, I am making this choice out of fear. Out of the fear that by saving my neck I
may lose my honor."
Referring to the importance of the retrieval of historic memory to "living in truth," he writes:
"The history of your nation is fixed in your memory. You know that in its history
a loyalty declaration signed in jail has always been a disgrace, loyalty to oneself and to
the national tradition of virtue. You can remember those who were tortured and jailed for
long years but who signed no declarations. And you know that you, too, will not sign
them, because you are unable and unwilling to renounce the memory of the others..."
And summarizing the central focus on freedom, "libertarian socialism," and "living in truth," he
maintains:
"In searching for truth, or, to quote Leszek Kolakowski, ‘by living in dignity,’
opposition intellectuals are striving not so much for a better tomorrow as for a better
today. Every act of defiance helps us build the framework of socialism, which should not
be merely or primarily a legal institutional structure but a real, day-to-day community of
free people."
Since he is the quintessential Central/Eastern European dissident and since his life story
is so familiar, I shall not rehearse the details of the biography of Vaclev Havel. I shall, however,
use what is probably his most famous essay, "The Power of the Powerless," to highlight and
summarize the most salient features that characterized Central/Eastern European dissident
movements.
In this essay, Havel makes his point with the well known allegory of "the green grocer."
In Havel’s account, he imagines the green grocer placing in his window the slogan, "Workers of
the World, Unite!" This he does not out of conviction but because he is afraid; by hanging the
sign, he is communicating to his superiors and would be informers that he is obedient and as
such should be left in peace. But since he is a human being with a sense of his own dignity, he
would be ashamed and embarrassed to admit it. Hence, "... the sign helps the green grocer to

conceal from himself the low foundations of his obedience, at the same concealing the low
foundations of power," hiding them behind the facade of something high, which is how the
former dissident describes "ideology." Havel describes this phenomenon in the following
manner:
"The primary excusatory function of ideology, therefore, is to provide people,
both as victims and pillars of the post-totalitarian system, with the illusion that the system
is in harmony with the human order and the order of the universe."
However, in the view of the Czech President, there is a yawning abyss between the aims
of life and aims of post-totalitarian systems. Life, in its essence, aims toward independent selfconstitution and self-organization, toward diversity and plurality, that is to say the fulfillment of
its freedom. Post-totalitarian systems on the other hand, demand uniformity and conformity,
serving "... people only to the extent necessary to ensure that people will serve it." Moreover, the
radius of its influence is ever widening. Any overstepping of predetermined roles is considered
as an attack by the system on itself for every transgression is a denial of the system.
Havel maintains that "ideology, in creating a bridge of excuses between the system and
the individual, spans the abyss between the aims of the system and the aims of life," pretending
that the requirements are derivative from the requirements of life, a world of appearances
attempting to pass for reality.
While the post-totalitarian system permeates every facet of life, since it does so with
ideological gloves, life in the system is saturated with hypocrisy and lies. And "because the
regime is captive to its own lies, it must falsify everything." Havel writes:
"Individuals need not believe all these mystifications, but they must behave as
though they did, or they must at least tolerate them in silence, or get along well with
those who work with them. For this reason, however, they must live within a lie. They
need not accept the lie. It is enough for them to have accepted their life with it and in it.
For by this very fact, individuals confirm the system, fulfill the system, make the system,
are the system."
The example of the green grocer hanging the slogan illustrates the workings of the
principle of social auto-totality. The former dissident asserts that "part of the essence of the posttotalitarian system is that it draws everyone into its sphere of power, not so they realize
themselves as human beings, but so they may surrender their human identity in favor of the
identity of the system, that is, so they may become agents of the system’s general automatism
and servants of its self-determined goals, so that they may participate in the common
responsibility for it, so they may be may be into and enslaved by it, like Faust with
Mephistopheles." But even more than this, through people’s involvement a general norm is
created which pressures their fellow citizens. And the system draws everyone into its sphere of
power in order that they may learn to be comfortable with their involvement, to identify with it to
the point where it becomes as though it were natural and inevitable, with any non-involvement
treated as an abnormality, as an attack on themselves. Havel observes that "by pulling everyone
into its power structure, the post-totalitarian system makes everyone instruments of a mutual
totality, the auto-totality of society." In a way that is reminiscent of Reinhold Niebuhr’s
distinction between the equality of guilt and the inequality of responsibility, the Czech President

claims that in such systems "position in the power hierarchy determines the degree of
responsibility, but it gives no one unlimited responsibility and guilt, nor does it completely
absolve anyone."
Havel’s piercing analysis demonstrates that although humans can be compelled to live
within a lie, this can be done only because of human beings are capable of living in this manner.
He states:
"The essential aims of life are present in every person. In everyone there is some
longing for humanity’s rightful dignity, for moral integrity, for free expression of being
and a sense of transcendence over the world of existences."
He continues:
"Yet, at the same time, each person is capable, to a greater of lesser degree, of
coming to terms with living within the lie. Each person somehow succumbs to a profane
trivialization of his or her inherent humanity, and utilitarianism. In everyone there is
some willingness to merge with the anonymous crowd and to flow comfortably along
with it down the river of pseudo-life. This is much more than a simple conflict between
two identities. It is something far worse; it is a challenge to the very notion of identity
itself."
Havel no less eloquently returns to his assertion that the capacity to surrender one’s
freedom, the willingness to live within the lie resides in the very grounds of human dignity.
Maintaining that "individuals can be alienated from themselves only because there is something
to alienate," he asserts that "the terrain of this violation is their authentic existence." He states
that "living the truth is thus woven directly into the texture of living a lie," for "it is the repressed
alternative, the authentic aim to which living a lie is an inauthentic response." Havel writes that:
"Only against this background does living a lie make any sense: it exists because
of that background. In its excusatory, chimerical rootedness in the human order, it is a
response to nothing other than the human predisposition to truth. Under the orderly
surface of the life of lies, therefore, there slumbers the hidden sphere of life in its real
aims, of is openness to truth."
This exposition sets the stage for the former dissident turning back to the example of the
green grocer, supposing that the grocer refuses to put up the slogan, to vote in farcical election,
to live within the lie. To be sure, the green grocer will pay a very high price for such "refusenik"
behavior. But, despite the seeming failure of his actions, he will have accomplished something
extremely important: he will have exposed the system for what it is, living within a lie; he will
have exposed the fact that the emperor is naked. And in the process, he discovers his long
suppressed identity and dignity.
The confrontation between the power of the post-totalitarian system and opposition
forces, comprised of people like the green grocer turned dissident, occurs initially not at the level
of quantifiable power but at the existential level. However, each act of living in truth, however
small, loosens the grip of the system and enlarges the sphere of freedom, however little, because
"if the suppression of the aims of life is a complex process, and if it is based on the multifaceted
manipulation of all expressions of life then, by the same token, every free expression of life

indirectly threatens the post-totalitarian system politically, including forms of expression to
which, in other social systems, no one would attribute any potential political significance, not to
mention explosive power."
Havel’s contention at this point sounds unrealistic, idealistic to the point being removed
from the reality of power relations of post-totalitarian systems of the former Eastern bloc. Yet, as
Havel so ably demonstrated during the Velvet Revolution and as President first of
Czechoslovakia, then the Czech Republic, he has a keen sense of "realpolitik" and is quite adept
at using the levers of power, as well as practicing the art of compromise. Although varying in
degrees of success in wielding of power, the same could be said of most members of the
Democratic Opposition in Hungary and Solidarity activists like Adam Michnik in Poland who
were keenly aware of the self-limiting nature of their activities as long as Soviet troops were
present in the two countries, and who though unequivocal oppositionists, maintained informal
and mostly secret contact with reform Communist technocrats and intellectuals (who by the end
of the Communist period, it would be fair to say, were Communists in name only, and at certain
points were willing to compromise to avoid bloodshed -- one of the lessons of ‘56!). And yet it
must be added that, coupled with numerous other factors (economic, geopolitical, military, and
most especially Gorbachev’s announcement that the Soviet Union would not intervene in the
internal affairs of its Warsaw Pact allies, that is to say the Brezhnev Doctrine was revoked and
replaced by the "Sinatra doctrine"), the activities of the Democratic Opposition in Hungary,
Solidarity activists like Michnik in Poland, and Havel and his fellow signers of Charter 77 in the
former Czechoslovakia, embodying the meaning of living in truth, played an indispensable part
in the demise of post-totalitarian systems and the Great Transformation of 1989-90.
IV.
The thread of continuity between István Angyal and the later dissidents of the
Democratic Opposition in Hungary, of Solidarity activists like Michnik in Poland, and Charter
77 signers like Havel in the former Czechoslovakia is their unremitant commitment to the cause
of freedom, to "living in truth," to the cause of human rights, and to oppositional activity. This
commitment had (and has) a religious, spiritual, ascetic quality. It is this that I call "the secular
spirituality of former Eastern bloc dissidents."
By "spirituality" I do not mean anything ephemeral, ethereal, otherworldly. Neither do I
identify it exclusively with the particularity of its institutional expressions in various religious
traditions, although admittedly the variety of traditions of spirituality are embodied in and
transmitted through their institutional manifestations. Rather, in the broadest and most general
sense, what I mean by "spirituality" is a life orientation, a way of being-in-the world. It entails an
"ultimate commitment" that integrates and transforms all of our other commitments (Wieman),
an "ultimate concern" that ties together and gives meaning to all of "preliminary concerns." In
this broad, general, inclusive sense, "spirituality" is a dimension of all religious traditions,
theistic and non-theistic. Considered in this fashion, we can affirm that historically spirituality
has found both supernaturalistic and naturalistic expressions in Western religious traditions. In
addition, when defined in this manner, spirituality can be considered to have not only ostensibly
religious but secular expressions as well.
By "secular," I am thinking in part of the Latin word, "saeculum" meaning "this world,"
"this age." In addition, the manner in which I use the word "secular" also chiefly has the modern

connotation of a way of being-in-the world without identifying with particular religious
institutions and traditions, and without any reference to the sacred -- except in a sociological,
functional sense. I shall not engage in the typical Western distinction of the ‘60s between
"secularist," positivist, positions that preclude any plausibility of the existence of the sacred and
"secularity," fully modern, oriented to this world, accepting modern science yet open to the
possibility of the existence of the sacred; both positions, as well as genuine agnosticism, existed
side by side in "the secular spirituality" of former Eastern bloc dissidents.
I have already alluded to the "ultimate commitment," "the ultimate concern" of these
dissidents that integrated and unified their other commitments and "preliminary" concerns,
exhibiting what could appropriately be called a radical faith, a radical trust. To be sure, "the
object" of this trust cannot be understood in any conventional theistic sense. What can be
considered the object of this radical trust or its functional equivalent is what I have called "the
cause of freedom," "to live in truth." While this sounds nebulous and imprecise, in my view it is
that very imprecision that captures the ethos of the dissidents. Precision, to be sure, is
indispensable to rigorous, critical thinking. However, attempts at too neat and facile
systemization all too easily lead to totalization -- something the former dissidents experienced all
their lives! Moreover, although I am not aware of any former members of Hungary’s Democratic
Opposition using the term, the cause of freedom to which they were (and are) committed in an
ultimate sense is unmanageable and uncontrollable, reminiscent of the notion of "World
Freedom" ("Világ Szabadság"), which, almost in a Hegelian sense, is the moving force of
history. And what amounts to the equivalent of this "World Freedom" finds concrete expression
for the dissidents as both freedom from and freedom for, freedom from manifested in the
advocacy of the institutions of political democracy and the safeguarding of human rights and
civil liberties, freedom for manifested in the demand for participation, the means for selfrealization in community with others, in part through political, in part through economic
democracy, workers’ ownership and management.
We have seen that in their unremitting devotion the former Eastern bloc dissidents paid
no heed to any adverse consequences to their own persons. Clearly, such a commitment entailed
considerable self-discipline and self-denial. In passing, it would not be exaggerating to mention a
loose parallel between the devotion of the dissidents and the tradition of the martyrs in
Christianity and Islam -- "martyrs" without any connotation of the more bizarre aspects of
martyrdom but in the best sense of the term, a "witness" to the point of being willing to die for
the integrity of one’s faith.
The most fascinating aspect of "the secular spirituality" of former Eastern bloc dissidents
is in my view their remarkable courage; I find it reminiscent of Tillich’s "courage to be," the
affirmation of one’s being "in spite of" the threat of non-being, whether in the form of fate and
death or emptiness and meaninglessness (which are the most pertinent for this discussion) or
guilt and condemnation, by taking the anxiety of the threat of non-being into oneself.
However, as I make this observation, I am keenly aware of my predilection to view the
ethos of the former dissidents from the perspective of my understanding of the Christian faith.
That is to say, I am inclined to see in the dissidents the "anonymous Christians" of Karl Rahner,
"the latent church" of Paul Tillich, and respondents to the fundamental intuition that what we do
matters because it matters everlastingly because it matters to the One who is everlasting, the
process perspective of Schubert Ogden.

However, the self-understanding of the former dissidents, as well as such precursors as
István Angyal, the integrity of their "secular spirituality" in its own terms needs to be affirmed.
That means accepting and affirming that, according to the dissidents’ own self-understanding,
what they did was for its sake, for the sake of their own dignity and authentic existence. And that
is its own self-justification.
Of course, in the writings and activities of the former dissidents, there is an element of
what Schubert Ogden has called "contributionism." That is to say, (instead of Ogden’s
Hartshornean process perspective) how historical memory would treat them is not an
unimportant motivating factor in the courage they manifested. And this anticipation of historic
memory is profoundly linked to a sense of continuity with courageous heroes of the nation’s past
-- a phenomenon we have seen particularly in the writings of Adam Michnik but no less present
among the members of Hungary’s Democratic Opposition and Czechoslovakia’s Charter 77
activists. Nevertheless, this seems far less important than the fact that since "living within the
lie" had become unbearable, "living in truth" was for its own sake and was its own selfjustification regardless of whether or not or how they would be remembered.
An integral part of "the secular spirituality" of former Eastern bloc dissidents, as well as
precursors like Angyal, both during the communist and the postcommunist periods, was their
dual emphasis on responsibility and reconciliation. As we have seen, for example, members of
the Democratic Opposition took responsibility for retrieving and telling the truth about ‘56;
doing so was indispensable to "living in truth." This was done not to point the finger or seek
reprisals but out of the deep seated conviction that only by taking responsibility and holding
people accountable for their actions could there be authentic reconciliation. Members of the
former Democratic Opposition, as for instance János Kis and Árpád Göncz, President of the
Republic of Hungary since 1990, certainly did not advocate putting on trial men, now in their
80s, who in ‘56 gave orders to shoot or participated in the shooting of unarmed demonstrators.
But they did advocate a full, unequivocal uncovering of the truth to the point of naming the
decision makers and perpetrators of atrocities. Only by honestly facing the truth about the past
can people be conciled to themselves, only then can disparate groups within the population be
reconciled to each other.
In Poland, Solidarity activists like Adam Michnik put no less a dual emphasis on
responsibility and reconciliation. Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of this is his friendship
with his one time jailer, General Jaruzelski, as the latter was put on trial for treason for his
imposition of martial law (he was recently acquitted). Similarly, although Havel eventually
signed the Czech Republic’s lustrace laws knowing that the Parliament would override his
opposition, he did lend his moral authority to opposition to the legislation.
One of the most significant aspects of what I have just described, which was no less true
during the communist period, is the lack of a "dualistic" attitude toward their opponents or those
who did not share their views and support their activities on the part of the former dissidents.
That is to say, in a way reminiscent of the lack of rancor they exhibited in the retrieval of the
historic memory of the Holocaust, there is no hint of a "we-they" mentality dividing people into
"the righteous" dissidents and the "unrighteous" communists, "the pure" oppositionistic and
"impure" silent majority that shared complicity in supporting the system. Rather, perhaps
expressed most eloquently by Havel, it is typical of the ethos of the former dissidents to contend
that there were no "righteous," that all, including themselves, shared, with varying degrees of

responsibility, in the complicity of supporting the post-totalitarian system. Recognition and
acceptance of this is a precondition for national reconciliation in their estimation.
The theme of reconciliation provides a point of transition for highlighting some of the
challenges such a secular spirituality poses for the development of a post-Holocaust, post-Gulag
theology. Not the least of these challenges concerns the very practical theological task of postcommunist reconciliation in the context of recently established democracies.
Since elsewhere I have written at greater length about the problem, I shall mention the
first of these challenges briefly. It concerns the complex relationship between the churches and
the former dissidents. As religious communities, all of which were persecuted in various ways at
different times during the communist period in the entire Eastern bloc, have been attempting to
establish their postcommunist identities, although one can increasingly find evidence of
countertrends and as unsafe as generalizations can be, one can claim that much of new leadership
of the churches of the region have tended to identify with the broad spectrum of populist
nationalism in which religious, cultural, and national symbols are linked. There is a tendency on
the part of populist nationalists, in spite of the presence of "liberals" in their ranks, to see free
thinking "liberals," inside the church and outside, with their concomitant advocacy of the
limitations of undue concentrations of power, as a threat to the integrity of faith, the unity of the
church, and the very survival of the nation. And at one extreme of populist nationalism, the use
of "liberal," "liberal-Bolshevik" as a derogatory euphemism for "Jew" is not far away (Michnik
recently bore the brunt of anti-Semitic attack by a Roman Catholic priest during a sermon).
Adherents of religious communities, especially the churches, in Central/Eastern as well
as Russia and the successor states, need to acknowledge that they can disagree with others
without considering them "opponents" and "enemies of religion and the nation," without
impugning the integrity of their motivations, and slurring religio-ethnic origins, that is to say
with the kind of civility that is a prerequisite for democracy. The range of complex issues free
thinking liberalism opens up -- the nature of truth claims, whether the criteria for adjudicating
truth claims should be confessional or subject to public criteria, whether the boundaries of these
communities and their truth claims are fixed or fluid, if fluid to what extent, and finally the
relationship between "Christ and culture" -- needs be discussed honestly and openly, affirming
the right to disagree, voicing one’s perspective vociferously yet with civility without demonizing
those on the other side and seeing them as threats to one’s existence.
One of the most urgent challenges for the development of a post-Holocaust, post-Gulag
theology, in my view, is the delineation of such a theology in a democratic way and that is
simultaneously in contact with yet critical and hopefully transformative of intellectual currents
that foster the exploration of the meaning(s) of democracy and nurture their development. An
example of this might be the development of a "democratic faith" in a "democratic God." Of
course, the question of the appropriateness of engaging in such a task once again open up the
range of issues mentioned above.
A prerequisite for the kind of openness I have been advocating (and have attempted to
model in this paper) is the affirmation of the commitment and ensuing activities of the former
dissidents, both during the communist and postcommunist periods, in their own right, their own
integrity, and see them as self-justifying and self-authenticating.

Finally, there is the urgent challenge of anti-Semitism, especially given its resurgence
during the postcommunist period. It goes without saying that for any kind of authentic historical
and national reconciliation to take place the churches of Central/Eastern Europe and Russia and
the successor states, especially because of their histories, need to confess and repent their
complicity in the Holocaust and to liberate themselves for the anti-Judaic tradition in Christianity
that has been a breeding ground for anti-Semitism.
The churches of the region have varied in their responses. For example, in Slovakia, a
semi-official rehabilitation of Josef Tiso has been underway; Cardinal Corec participated in the
dedication of a plaque in his memory; local clergy did the same in Tiso’s birthplace. Little
attempt has been made to come to terms with the past. I have already alluded to anti-Semitic
verbal attacks on Adam Michnik during a sermon by a Roman Catholic priest in Poland.
Archbishop Josef Glemp has both condemned anti-Semitism and been maladroit in handling it.
On the other hand, various ecclesiastical commissions and institutions have been very much in
the forefront in dealing with the issue. In Hungary, the Conference of Bishops issued a pastoral
letter confessing and repenting the churches’ complicity in the Holocaust -- one of the most far
reaching documents to be issued by a representatives of a church body in the region. For all such
important work, it is clear they are but the beginning of the process of historic and national
reconciliation.
This raises the problem of the historical fusion of religious, national, and cultural
symbols. To come to grips with the past, the ambiguous history of this fusion needs to be looked
at carefully, accurately, and inclusively. The whole issue of the relationship between "Christ and
culture" in a postcommunist democracy, in the distinctive particularity of each nation and the
equally fundamental interrelatedness to its neighbors, needs to be examined.
An integral part of my final point is the need to affirm and appreciate the distinctiveness
of an assimilated Jewish culture within the particularity of each nation, a point that I suspect the
former dissidents of Jewish origin would not accept. István Deák mentions that although in
Hungary assimilated Jews, as we have seen, thought of themselves as nothing else than Magyars,
they have made unique contributions to Hungarian culture precisely because of their
distinctiveness as assimilated Jews.
As a non-Jewish Magyar, I have always felt embarrassed and ashamed that there were
Jewish Hungarians who felt the need to hide their Jewish background. I could certainly
understand why they would want to do so. But what is wrong with affirming one’s Hungarianess
and simultaneously affirming one’s Jewish roots, no matter how much one is assimilated? And
what is wrong with gentile Hungarians affirming the genuine Hungarianess of Jewish
Hungarians and affirming equally their Jewish roots? This suggests a degree of openness that
affirms and accepts both distinctiveness and identity without seeing either distinctiveness of
identity as absolute. And such a degree of openness may provide an appropriate model for an
authentic postcommunist reconciliation.
I have spoken with considerable trepidation about the challenges to theology in a
Central/Eastern European context; after all, I have lived in the U.S. for 37 years. Nevertheless,
having a foot inside and outside both worlds, I have taken the risk of highlighting and making
some judgments about theological issues facing the region as I see them.

However, these issues are no less real for religious communities in the United States,
especially the development of a post-Holocaust, post-Gulag theology delineated in a democratic
way. What this involves, among other things, is a challenge to explore honestly and consider
pragmatically whether our theological formulations enhance or obstruct democratic
development. And, of course, given the imprecision and confusion surrounding the use of the
word "democracy," we are challenged, both in the U.S. and Central/Eastern Europe, to explore
the possible meaning(s) of democracy.
But the biggest challenge "the secular spirituality" of former Eastern bloc dissidents
presents to religious communities in the U.S. is to Western triumphalism, something that few of
them share. Does the end of the Cold War mean that life in one system has been meaningful for
forty-five years, meaningless in the other? Such a contention would be dismissive of and
trivialize the lives of the peoples of the former Eastern bloc over the circumstances of which they
had little choice.
To be sure, there is much to celebrate. But there are many tragedies, past and present, to
be faced. Dissident turned President Árpád Göncz has expressed a fairly typical perspective
among former dissidents, especially in Hungary, in claiming that in the Cold War there were
only losers. And the present, the moment of "the melancholy of rebirth," is too important to be
consumed by the pseudo-euphoria of triumphalism.
Perhaps the most important challenge the "secular spirituality of former Eastern bloc
dissidents" presents for all of us, regardless of what "bloc" which we resided in geographically,
to live in freedom and in truth as authentic human beings.
V.
I set the context for this paper by means of some personal recollections and historical
reflections. I proceeded by using the figure of the executed freedom fighter István Angyal as
paradigmatic of the attempts of the Democratic Opposition in Hungary to retrieve and reinterpret
the Revolution of 1956, a fundamental part of their attempt "to live in truth," by means of which
it questioned the legitimacy of the communist regime. In addition, as a survivor of Auschwitz,
Angyal was equally paradigmatic and served as a role model for those members of Hungary’s
Democratic Opposition who either remembered or tried to retrieve the historic memory of the
Holocaust which, coupled with the experience of the Gulag in the broadest sense of the word,
shaped their unequivocal commitments. I then explored further some of the ideas and activities
of the former Democratic Opposition in Hungary. More briefly, I drew parallels to the key
figures of Adam Michnik in Poland and Vaclav Havel in the former Czechoslovakia. The
religious and spiritual quality of the former dissidents’ commitment and dedication I analyzed
and highlighted the challenges such a secular spirituality for the development of a postHolocaust, post-Gulag theology.
The following words by Erazim Kohak provide an eloquent summary of "the secular
spirituality of former Eastern bloc dissidents:"
"... the immensely brave men and women of the civil initiative, killed, jailed,
exiled, are unlikely to bring down the impersonal edifice of Soviet rule. Their great
achievement is that, before all eternity, they have spoken the word of truth in time... Their

success, whatever the ‘results,’ is in having been at all, in having spoken the word of
eternal truth amid the complexity of time."

